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ABSTRACT
According to the ‘Consumption Exclusion Thesis’ defended by Hegel, the fact that
food is consumed means that it cannot be considered a proper art object: art is sup-
posed to be timeless and lasting, two characteristics that food lacks by definition.
According to the ‘Interest Exclusion Thesis’ defended by Kant, when judging a work of
art we should not have any kind of interest towards it, because aesthetic appreciation is
characterized by disinterested pleasure. In order to defend the idea that culinary objects
can be art objects we will challenge both theses by proposing a definition of art able to
explain how culinary objects do last in time even after their consumption, and how
our approach to them can be disinterested even if we are physiologically attracted by
the food.
Art and food matter for different reasons. Typically, we associate art with beauty, emo-
tions, and creativity, while food is considered our principal means of sustenance (it is our
fuel, providing energy to make our bodies work). In a nutshell, food stands at the cross-
road of several main aspects of life: energy (what food is), creativity (the ways food can
be prepared), and pleasure. A question that emerges from several essays of this issue of
The Monist is whether these two apparently distant universes have something in com-
mon, so that food may be included, in some sense, in the vast universe of the arts. Can
food be interpreted as a work of art? Can the properties usually applied to understand
and interpret artworks be used to philosophically explain food as well?
These questions fall within the broader domain of the philosophy of art which,
over the last fifty years, has placed particular attention on two fundamental issues:
the first concerns the identity of art, the second concerns the inclusiveness of the
concept of art.1 Ever since the early twentieth century, art has repeatedly posed the
question of its identity, and philosophy has not failed to accept the challenge, reason-
ing widely and from different perspectives on the issue of its definition. Is it possible
to formulate a definition of art that is sufficiently broad to include twentieth-century
artistic productions, i.e., objects that seem to share many properties with common
things rather than with works of art? Where, exactly, can we draw the line between
the domain of art and that of simple things? This line, indeed, marks a very clear
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separation, that between ordinary objects and artworks, where the latter are com-
monly considered extraordinary both in terms of ontology and in terms of axiology.
The ontological question became relevant once artists claimed that the artworld
should include strange objects such as readymades: together with other creations,
such objects ended up deconstructing all or part of the Vasarian interpretative
canon,2 which had underlined the narratives of art history for centuries.
The Vasarian canon, along with the mimetic theory, had worked quite well to ex-
plain art and its variations up until the twentieth century, when cubism, the avant-
gardes, abstract expressionism, up to performing arts and posthistorical arts—as
Arthur Danto called them3—seemed to definitively deconstruct the ontologies and
theories of art known until then, which had offered a good explanation to answer the
question4 of what art is. Now, in a landscape in which artists deconstruct art on the for-
mal level, depriving it of the properties that traditionally distinguish it from ordinary re-
ality, one may wonder whether food may have a place within the domain of art. What
we should consider now is whether this question is indeed legitimate and what theoret-
ical foundations underlie it. It will therefore be necessary to look a little more closely at
some theories that have addressed the question about the identity of food.
So first of all, let’s start by giving some definitions in order to define our field of
research. What do we mean by ‘food’ when we ask the question of whether food can
be art?5 If ‘food’ is understood as ‘cuisine’, we could say that it obviously involves the
creative act of mixing its components together and subjecting them to different types
of processing; also, food can be arranged on the plate in a way that is very similar to
drawing a shape or making a sculpture. Nonetheless, there seems to be a fundamen-
tal difference between culinary products and paintings, sculptures, or music: in fact,
however unpleasant a life without art may be, it is impossible to die because of a lack
of aesthetic experience, whereas food is directly related to our physiology and is ab-
solutely necessary for our survival.
For this reason, even if food can be said to have aesthetic value, we have a very
natural and physiological inclination towards it. But how can we feel a disinterested
form of pleasure for something we know is indispensable for us? This point is
stressed by the ‘Interest Exclusion Thesis’ defended by Kant,6 who maintains that
aesthetic pleasure towards a given object should not be based on our desire for
that object. He considers the pleasures of eating to be agreeable but not beautiful (a
judgment analyzed in this issue by Nick Zangwill). Let’s now ask some questions:
• Is it possible to be disinterested when it comes to food and beverages?
• What does ‘disinterested’ mean when applied to food?
• Consider Ferran Adria’s statement that “People do not come to elBulli to eat, but
to have an aesthetic experience.” What does that mean?
The first important problem here concerns appreciation. Kant sees aesthetic ap-
preciation as a disinterested pleasure: in fact he maintains that when seeing a painting
we do not want to consume or own it; in aesthetic appreciation we do not satisfy a de-
sire in the same way as we do when we eat.
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In the Critique of Judgment, Kant maintains that judgments of taste are both subjec-
tive and universal.7 They are subjective because they are pleasure responses and do
not essentially involve any claims about the concept of the object itself (what matters
is not the picture I see, but rather the pleasing effect of the picture on me).
However, they are universal and not merely personal, because they must be disinter-
ested. When I am appreciating a painting aesthetically, I am not thinking about how
much money it is worth, or whether it is a portrait of a family member, or even about
who painted it.
The serious (if not to say critical) problem presented by food from a Kantian per-
spective is that it, too, is instrumentally valuable. We cannot really appreciate food
aesthetically, and consequently food cannot be considered a work of art because we
need food in order to survive. And Kant says that the aesthetic judgment needs to
consider an object’s intrinsic value and not its instrumental value. But the point is, if
an artwork has an intrinsic value, that does not mean that it cannot also have an in-
strumental value! Consider the example made by Nelson Goodman in Ways of
Worldmaking: we could use a painting by Rembrandt to replace a broken window.8
In this case, clearly, the painting would have an instrumental value, but this would
not change its intrinsic qualities. An altarpiece can be an object of worship as well as
a beautiful work of art.
The Kantian problem concerns the objective judgment of the qualities of artistic
objects: if the object is valuable in itself and not in relation to anything else, we are
allowed to consider its qualities on those grounds alone, feeling free from any instru-
mental temptations. But is that true? Is it true that in order to have objective judg-
ments we need to focus only on the intrinsic qualities of an object? And, even so,
could we not consider the intrinsic qualities of an object that also has an instrumental
value? I could eat something because of its tastiness or presentation, if I am in an aes-
thetic frame of mind, or I can eat it simply because I am hungry, considering the ob-
ject exclusively in its instrumental value. It seems that we are indeed able to
approach eating from an aesthetically-minded standpoint: functional objects can be
submitted to a purely qualitative appreciation. In fact, we can approach food also
from a cultural, religious, or sentimental standpoint, therefore without focusing on
its being pleasurable or indispensable for us.9 There seems to be no good reason to
denigrate the genuine aesthetic experience that food may provide. Thus one of the
standard grounds on which food is denied the status of art is unconvincing. It seems
possible to have disinterested experiences of objects that have other, additional uses,
and food is a case in point.
Let’s now consider the second thesis, defended by G.W.F. Hegel,10 concerning
consumption. According to the ‘Consumption Exclusion Thesis’, food cannot be a
genuine artistic medium because the object of culinary art is consumed when it is
enjoyed.11 A cake exists only so long as we do not eat it, whereas proper art objects
exist forever or, if not, at least for a long period of time. This thesis is based on the
idea that genuine art is timeless, raising a question about the object’s identity: if nor-
mal artistic objects such as paintings and sculptures last over time, how could we
give the same status to objects—such as culinary ones—whose appreciation seems
to cause their disappearance? Or, in different words, is duration a necessary
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condition for genuine art objects? If so, clearly there is a problem, because this condi-
tion does not seem to be satisfied by culinary objects: the act of eating destroys and
alters the object of our gustatory delight.
In order to defend the idea that culinary objects may legitimately be considered
art objects, we need challenge the Consumption Exclusion Thesis, as we have already
done with the Interest Exclusion Thesis. This can be achieved by considering these
two points:
1. The Consumption Exclusion Thesis depends on a dubious conception of
artistic objects.
2. We need explain how culinary art can and does last beyond its consumption.
Are all legitimate works of art primarily made of matter? No. It is not difficult to
find examples of artistic objects depending as much on immaterial conditions as on
their material components; suffice it to think about music, theater and dance, or, in
general, about all performance arts. The Consumption Exclusion Thesis does not
consider the latter, namely arts that depend on their structure more than on their
material conditions. In performance arts, typically, the imposed structure is different
from the material components in which or by which it manifests itself: in other
words, the structure is distinct from any particular material instance. And it is pre-
cisely by recognizing the formal structure of performance arts that we are able to
identify them. Therefore, a duration condition essentially based on numerical iden-
tity cannot apply to these kinds of art objects, and not even to other objects essen-
tially lacking an enduring structure, such as improvisational jazz, dance, and songs.
Let’s follow Goodman again, considering his suggestion to distinguish between
autographic and allographic arts.12 Culinary objects share a kind of formal structure
that parallels the one found in certain performance arts: instead of calling it a score,
a choreography, or a script we call it a recipe. The recipe structures the way in which
food elements are combined, creating the overall object of our appreciation. The rec-
ipe makes the dish what it is, and its structure is distinct from the material ingre-
dients in which it manifests itself. A culinary art object is the unique combination of
a set of material ingredients through a formalized method or preparation, where the
formalized method is the recipe structuring the ingredients so that they will produce
the given dish. As happens with musical melodies, culinary objects are also character-
ized by something more than the ingredients or basic elements that make them up.
We eat the instance (particular) and not the recipe (universal). In this way the con-
sumption problem is solved.
Indeed, what is a recipe? The way in which a dish is recorded or somehow sym-
bolized. According to the principle of universalization, we should treat similar cases
alike. Given the similarity between culinary objects and performance art objects
(consider the performances by Marina Abramovic and Tino Se`hgal), and given the
fact that performance art objects count as proper art objects, we can classify culinary
objects as proper art objects as well.
Needless to say, there are important differences between food and performance
arts: food is eaten while performance art objects are not (or better, they are not
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usually eaten, even though they can be. Consider the famous Untitled [1991], by the
Cuban artist Felix Gonzales-Torres: a work made up of a 175-pound pile of candy,
from which visitors are encouraged to take samples).13 Food has a nutritional value
in addition to its aesthetic properties. However, they can both be seen as belonging
to the category of art objects.
So now, after having argued against both these classical thesis, what kind of defini-
tion of ‘Art Object’ should we propose (in order to include culinary objects in it)?
We would like to suggest a definition that may solve these two problems as well as
similar ones—that is, a definition able to solve the classical questions posed by so-
called unconventional works of art. Our definition may help clarify why these
objects—among which we include food—could be considered, under particular con-
ditions, as proper works of art.
First of all, it is important to note that the category we generally call ‘food’ is very
broad, including at least three different kinds of objects. So the question should be
modified as follows: can all objects that we consider food fall under the label ‘works
of art’? The straightforward answer is no or, at least, not necessarily. The category of
‘food’ usually includes: a. natural objects (i.e., things like tomatoes, potatoes, vegeta-
bles, meat, grapes, and so on); b. artifacts (i.e., pasta, bread, pizza, wine, and so on);
and (our thesis) c. works of art. The most interesting cases are those in which the
same object could be positioned in all these three different groups.
Let’s consider a tomato. The very same tomato can be, at the same time, seen as
belonging to all three different groups, depending on certain external conditions. It
may be: (a) A natural object; (b) An artifact; and (c) A work of art. Let’s take a
closer look. The first case is simple. A tomato on its plant is a natural or hybridized
object; that is, an object produced by nature or hybridized by men. In the majority
of cases, natural objects as such are not works of art, but they may become artifacts
in a very simple way.
Now let us consider a second tomato. It is indiscernible from the first one and
hangs from the same plant. But, in this case, the plant is in an apartment and the
owner uses it as an ornament for his decorative roof garden, removing it from the
earth and placing it in a large yellow pot positioned with other pots of different col-
ors and shapes. The result is a beautiful roof garden, a kind of impressionist painting
for an observer who knows the history of modern painting. As such, the owner uses
the roof garden as a pleasant place to take refuge from his busy life.
Let’s now consider a more complex case with a third tomato, which has a very dif-
ferent destiny. The owner loves the tomato plants in his garden and is also a lover of
the well-known cocktail called Bloody Mary. It is a very cold evening and our man,
whose name is Henry, has run out of tomatoes but does not feel like going out to
buy more. So, regretfully, he takes a tomato from his plant. He then squeezes it to
make tomato juice, which he mixes with two parts of vodka.
We now imagine two different variations to our scenario. In the first, Henry is
down-to-earth: he drinks when he is thirsty, and eats when is hungry. When possible,
he prefers to take tomatoes from the fridge; but when this is not possible, he picks
them from the plant. He does not know the history of Bloody Mary, all he knows is
that once a friend made that drink for him. He still remembers the recipe: three parts
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tomato and two of vodka. The memory of that superb beverage helps him reproduce
that drink without making significant changes to the original recipe.
Let us now turn to the second scenario. Here Henry is a totally different man. He
is very sophisticated and chooses the tomato for his cocktail with great attention. He
knows that there has to be more than five drops of Tabasco, and he also knows that
it is fundamental to use the right kind of lemon—perhaps one from Sicily, not too
ripe. He often uses gin instead of vodka: he prefers it because of the juniper berries,
which give the drink a particular taste. When asked why he loves that specific cocktail
so much, he usually answers that it is because of the color, whose intensity reminds
him of paintings by Titian, and because of its strong and vigorous taste and, finally,
because of the legend of Bloody Mary, the Queen. The red color of the tomato juice
symbolizes the violent temperament of Queen Mary, who started her life as a happy
girl and then fell prey to a fury of destruction. Anger and revenge are violent emo-
tions, and their representation is necessarily red-colored. Another story comes to
Henry’s mind every time he makes the cocktail: some claim that Bloody Mary, if in-
voked three times in front of a mirror at night, reappears, with bloody hands, to kill
the person who evoked her. How many stories have been represented by that color!
Now let’s get back to our thought experiment. Our theory is that the drink in the
third scenario is a case of food transfigured into an artwork. That is, food here has
the same ontological structure as a work of art. How can this structure be described?
A useful concept here is that of semantic vehicle:14 food is used as a semantic vehicle,
that is, as a vehicle for the mental representations of the person making the Bloody
Mary and for the appreciation of those who drink it.
In all our examples the tomatoes are in themselves indiscernible. In spite of this,
in one case we have a natural object (the tomato on the plant); in another case,
where the tomato becomes an ingredient of the recipe for Bloody Mary, it is part of
an artifact—in other words, a natural object intentionally modified by the maker of
the cocktail. Finally, Henry’s own Bloody Mary is an authentic work of art. That is, it
follows a recipe, whose properties are intentionally modified following a particular
idea—Henry’s idea. This idea depends partly on Henry’s creativity, partly on the his-
tory of cuisine, and partly on the taste of people living in the same context. The sec-
ond Bloody Mary, unlike the first one, is a work of art because (1) it embodies a
series of meanings, deposited in the history of cuisine by the first maker of the cock-
tail and recreated by Henry, who also (2) revisited, at least partly, the cocktail’s taste
by changing the physical composition of the cocktail.
To summarize what we have said so far, it is possible to treat food in the same
way as other ordinary objects that have been included in the class of works of art.
And this is true even though food is a particular object in many respects, because it
exhibits properties that are vital functions for our survival.
So let us go back to our starting question: can food be art? The answer is: yes, in
some particular cases. Is all food art? The answer is no, for the reasons explained
above. Our idea is that a good definition has to involve a bundle of conditions re-
garding, at least, the physicality of the object, the intentionality of its creator and the
history of the practice in which the object is used.15 To generalize the considerations
made so far in terms of philosophy of art, we can put it in these terms: in a way, as
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we have verified, anything can be included in the class of works of art. Artists have
demonstrated this by using readymades and producing a whole series of works that
are indistinguishable from their ordinary counterparts. However, we would be wrong
if we considered these common counterparts as truly indistinguishable in every re-
spect from works of art. There are differences; one only needs to know where to
look for them.
Our thesis is that sometimes these differences belong to the object itself, other
times to properties that concern the object in some particular respect. These proper-
ties can be traced back to what we will call the ‘standard conditions’ of art. These
conditions, together, have always defined the class of artworks. Since the beginning
of the twentieth century, art has produced objects that have led us to rethink the on-
tology of art, in most cases broadening and enriching it, and to revisit traditional the-
ories of art—a process that has evidently allowed us to consider food as a good
candidate to belong to the class of works of art. This was possible because the stan-
dard criteria were interpreted or applied in substantially different ways from the
Vasarian model.
An articulated discourse on the standard criteria would obviously fall outside of
the present scope and requires a broad reflection that cannot be developed here.16
However, we can at least list them and make a few detailed considerations about the
question of food as art. A first list of standard conditions for art includes:
1. the object (that is, the work of art; obviously the term ‘object’ is understood
in its broadest ontological meaning);
2. the subject (in the dual sense of the artist and the public);
3. the possibility of interpretation (which includes, but does not coincide with,
its aboutness);
4. normativity (i.e., the vast set of rules, conventions, and uses that give shape
to artistic practices and, in the best cases, allow for the formation of a
style);
5. the institutional framework (i.e., the dynamics of contexts where art has
value, which can be more or less institutionalized);
6. a story (or the narration that revolves around art);
7. the market (i.e., the demand and supply of works of art, whose dynamics
have acquired great importance in the world of contemporary art, showing
characteristics that are typical of financial markets).
These seven conditions, which, as we said, are necessary, are quite stable in the
sense that we find them in all historical epochs, no matter the given concept of art.
The first four conditions are related to the work, or to the space of the work, while
the last three are external to the work and related to its context. Our thesis is that
even though these are standard conditions, they have been shaped, interpreted, and
applied in different ways throughout history. This, on the one hand, explains why
the concept of art has undergone such significant variations over time, but on the
other hand also records a state of affairs, that is, the great productive creativity that
has always been the raison d’^etre of the world of art. In other words, in relation to
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this list of necessary conditions, contemporary art—under the guise of the multiple
currents that have taken shape and form since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury—has not really introduced radical innovations, or markedly new conditions.
Rather, contemporary art has: (1) shaped the standard conditions differently or, (b)
reframed the standard conditions in radically different terms, or else (c), given new
weight to each of the standard conditions.
Coming back to food and the issues opened up by our Bloody Mary thought ex-
periment, we can argue as follows. The second Bloody Mary is an art object because
of the bundle of proprieties that differentiate it from the first one. These properties
concern the material composition of the cocktail, the intentionality of the person
who makes it, its history and some particular aspects, partly overlapping with the his-
tory of art, regarding for example the aesthetic appearance of the cocktail or the pe-
culiar declination of its taste. Our creative Henry, when creating his own version of a
Bloody Mary, aspired to combine different skills: his ability to make a great cocktail
and his extraordinary competence in the history of art, but also his capacity to change
the material preparation of an ordinary Bloody Mary by introducing some variations
in the ingredients used.
Both skills are important to transform an ordinary Bloody Mary into Henry’s pe-
culiar Bloody Mary. Of course, Henry would hardly have thought of combining his
culinary skills with his artistic knowledge had he not received suggestions from the
artworld (which has become incredibly wide and hospitable) and from that of cook-
ing, which aims not only to achieve technical perfection, but also to enhance the role
of the senses in food tasting. The point is to integrate the experience of nutrition,
therefore the functional aspects of food, with aesthetic experience (perceptive, gusta-
tory, olfactory and generally sensory) which, when food is truly transfigured into art,
becomes an artistic experience.
Consider One and Three Chairs (1965) by Joseph Kosuth: in order to understand
the work it is necessary to make the medium transparent, i.e., to disregard the arte-
factual characteristics of the medium as well as their references to the usability of the
artifact. In the same way, for the transformation of food into a work of art to take
place, it is necessary, to some extent, to disregard the functionality of food.
Functional properties, which evoke standard ways of approaching food, must be as-
similated to the background properties of the object, exactly as happens with ready-
mades. This theoretical operation allows for the transfiguration of the object without
(only) transforming the internal properties of the object but rather (or mainly)
reconfiguring its relational or external properties.
This brings us to our last point. In order to understand what a work of art is, we
should overlook neither the knowledge of the recipe, nor modern history, including
history of art, nor the particularly significant dynamics of today’s artworld. When,
then, can food be a work of art?
In all those cases in which it can be seen as a social artifact embodying a representation
in the form of an inscribed trace upon a medium that is not transparent. That is, a me-
dium that needs to be interpreted in order to fully understand the new object which that
particular food has become.
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NOTES
1. For an overview and a discussion of the main theories of contemporary art, see Carroll (1999) and
Andina (2013).
2. Vasari 1991.
3. Danto 1997.
4. Plato 1993, Book X.
5. On the relationship between food and art on the one hand, and food and philosophy on the other, from
an aesthetic point of view, see Sweeney (2017). Sweeney offers an impressive historical overview of the
philosophy of taste—from Plato, Aristotle, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the Enlightenment,
Kant, Brillat-Savarin, up until postmodernism and analytic philosophy—and, in the last part of the book,
sketches the main lines and arguments of the current philosophical debate on these topics.
6. Kant 2000, §§1–5.
7. Ibid. §§6–9.
8. Goodman 1978, 67–70.
9. See Telfer 1996, especially ch. 2–3.
10. Hegel 1975.
11. Cf. Korsmeyer 1999, 62; as for the problem of consumption and the solution suggested here we follow
D. Monroe (2007, 133–44).
12. Goodman 1978.
13. Felix Gonzales Torres’s work is subtitled Portrait of Ross in L.A. (1991). It was made in memory of the
author’s lover, Ross Laycock. When healthy, Ross weighed about 175 pounds, and the shrinking of the
candy pile mirrors how Ross wasted away until he eventually died of complications from AIDS
(Gonzalez-Torres also died from AIDS in 1996, at age 39.) The installation has been on display in vary-
ing forms since 1991, and its themes have appeared in Gonzalez-Torres’s work for many years.
14. See Danto 1981.
15. For the idea that art is a cluster concept, but in a disjunctive form, see Gaut (2000, 2005).
16. For a broader discussion see Andina (2017, 54ff).
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